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Abstract: This article aims to explore how overall education inequality is articulated in four 
basic constituent parts (inequality among women and men, inequality favoring men and 
inequality favoring women) and how these parts have jointly evolved over time in the world 
and its regions. We investigate whether or not these regions have gone through periods in 
which, as education expands, both education inequality and the gender gap in education 
declined simultaneously. For that purpose, we have developed a new inequality index adapted 
to the ordinal nature of educational attainment with nice decomposability properties that can 
be useful for scholars and policy-makers to track the evolution of overall education inequality 
and all its subcomponents. Our findings suggest that (i) the composition of education inequality 
has been shifting dramatically over time; in particular (ii) inequality among men was usually 
higher than inequality among women until the turn of the century; from then onwards women’s 
and men’s educational distributions are equally unequal; (iii) the educational advantage of 
women over men has become the most important source contributing to educational inequality 
for most high- and middle-income countries, and (iv) the world and its regions have gone (and 
are expected to go) through considerably long periods of time where education expansion is 
not at odds with both gender and education inequality reductions. 
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1. Introduction 
For a long time, a global expansion of mass schooling has been sweeping the globe. This 
process, which has been observed in all countries around the world, has been highly beneficial 
for an ever growing number of individuals, so this is a worthy cause for celebration (Morrisson 
and Murtin 2009). While a growing body of scholarship has shed considerable light on the 
‘efficiency part’ of the process (i.e. the country-level average education attainments are 
reasonably well-documented), much less is known about the ‘equality part’. Whether or not 
some countries or certain groups of individuals within those countries benefit from education 
expansion disproportionately more than others is a matter of great scientific interest and policy 
concern which, unfortunately, has not received much scholarly attention and is still quite poorly 
understood. 
One of the facets of education inequality that has indeed attracted the attention of many scholars 
is the gender gap in education. During the last decades we are witnessing the emergence of a 
“global first” phenomenon: the closing and reversal of the gender gap in educational 
attainment. For the first time in history, in many high- and middle-income countries, young 
women are attaining higher levels of education than young men, and the same trend is expected 
to occur in other countries as well in the coming decades (Esteve et al 2016). While relevant 
and informative, the comparisons of average attainments for women and men typically ignore 
the potential heterogeneity that might exist within those groups. Yet, implicitly treating women 
and men as if they were homogeneous groups does not allow addressing key questions about 
the education distribution. For instance: Is the education distribution among women becoming 
more unequal as their average attainment surpasses that of men? Is the education inequality 
among women higher than that of men? Does the reduction – and eventual reversal – of the 
gender gap in education go hand-in-hand with less educational inequality overall? How are 
these inequalities related with one another? While it seems clear that (i) overall education 
inequality, (ii) education inequality among women and among men, and (iii) education 
inequality favoring women and favoring men are interrelated with one another, no previous 
study has attempted to investigate and flesh out the nature of that relationship. For the first 
time, in this paper we put together these different ingredients into a coherent whole to explore 
how overall education inequality is decomposed and relates to its basic constituent parts. Such 
decomposition is extremely useful for scholars and policy-makers to go beyond purely 
descriptive results and analyze what factors are the most important drivers of inequality and its 
evolution over time.  
The importance of knowing the trends of these different inequalities stems from their 
differential impacts on societies around the world, which are multiple and might go in opposite 
directions. On the one hand, increasing education inequality – either for the population as a 
whole or for women and men separately – serves as a wellspring for increases in inequality in 
many other quality of life domains (higher variability in educational attainment is associated 
with higher dispersion in income and wages, higher job insecurity, and lower economic growth, 
occupational mobility, physical and mental health and general well-being – see Dorius 2013, 
Ballarino et al 2014). On the other hand, the closing and reversal of the gender gap in education 
in favor of women might increase female labor force participation (particularly in better-paying 
formal-sector jobs), prolong the duration of women in the labor force (which in turn could lead 
to more efficient economic outcomes; Klasen and Lamanna 2009) and generate more 
egalitarian attitudes (both in the domestic and public spheres, Esteve et al 2016) that could 
eventually shift the balance of power towards females (Grant and Behrman 2010). 
Symmetrically, high levels of gender inequality in favor of men have long been considered to 
be detrimental for the economic performance of countries and the well-being of their 
inhabitants (Klasen and Lamanna 2009). Given the benefits of both high levels of overall and 
gender equality in education, it becomes relevant to ask whether both types of equality can be 
maximized simultaneously, and in which situations possible trade-offs between both objectives 
can emerge. These are key questions to which we aim to give answers in this article.  
What do we know about global trends in education inequality and the gender gap in education? 
As regards the former, opposing findings from different studies – partly driven by the use of 
alternative data sets, methods and indicators – have not facilitated the creation of a consensus 
among scholars. At most, a majority of researchers could agree that education inequality has 
followed an inverted U-shaped trajectory over time, whose maximal height and turning point 
depend on the geographical region we are dealing with (Morrisson and Murtin 2009, 2013, 
Dorius 2013) – an admittedly simplistic vignette. As regards the gender gap in education, most 
studies suggest that its evolution over time has not been monotonic either (Wils and Goujon 
1998, Grant and Behrman 2010). While in its initial stages the expansion of education 
predominantly benefited men, in later stages women caught-up, thus reducing and even 
reversing the gender gap. What this sketchy account does not provide is a precise description 
of the timing in which both phenomena take place. Depending on whether the trend reversal of 
education inequality occurs after or before the gender gap turnaround, countries might 
experience periods in which trends in both types of inequality run in opposite directions, or in 
which both types of inequalities increase or decrease at the same time. If it turns out that at 
some point they start declining simultaneously, an opportunity window opens up where 
educational expansion brings the additional benefits of reducing both overall and gender 
inequality in education (i.e. a period where there is no dilemma between ‘efficiency’ and 
‘equality’). Whether or not the world and its regions have gone (or can still expect to go) 
through such a period will be a main empirical goal of our analysis. 
Summing up, this article aims to explore how overall education inequality is articulated in its 
different constituent parts and how these parts have jointly evolved over time in the world and 
its regions to identify if, and for how long, they have reaped the benefits of education expansion 
alongside simultaneous reductions in overall inequality and its components. To attain our 
research objectives, we have created a new measure of education inequality specifically crafted 
to simultaneously meet two requirements that are not met by currently existing inequality 
measures. First, our measure decomposes overall inequality in two components: inequality 
within groups (including inequality among women and among men) and between groups 
(which can be further decomposed in inequalities in favor of women and inequalities in favor 
of men). Second, it has been designed to handle the ordinal data we are dealing with in this 
paper (currently, virtually all education inequality measures are based on cardinal information, 
like ‘years of schooling’). Hopefully, the new measure proposed in this paper can be a useful 
addition to those practitioners aiming at gauging inequality in the context of ordinal variables.  
The empirical analysis relies on the latest version of the Barro and Lee (2015) database 
(henceforth BL) for the period from 1950 to 2010 and on some of our own projections, 
extending the results up to 2040. The huge geographic coverage of the database (146 countries) 
allows performing both global and regional analyses over time. Our findings suggest that (i) 
the composition of education inequality has been shifting dramatically over time; in particular 
(ii) inequality among men was usually higher than inequality among women until year 2000 
approximately, from then onwards women’s and men’s educational distributions are equally 
unequal; (iii) the educational advantage of women over men has become the most important 
source contributing to educational inequality for most high- and middle-income countries, and 
(iv) educational expansion initially implied increased overall education inequality and (for a 
shorter period of time) higher gender inequality, but most world regions have gone or will go 
through periods where such expansion is not at odds with gender or overall education inequality 
reductions. 
 
2. Background and hypotheses 
It is difficult to overestimate the importance of education for the well-being of individuals 
across their entire life cycle. In general, highly educated individuals tend to have a better 
command over resources, higher levels of employment and better-paid jobs, they have longer 
and less unequal lifespans, lower risk of getting divorced, of being poor or materially deprived 
and higher levels of subjective well-being (Farkas, 2003; Härkönen and Dronkers, 2006; 
Lafortune, 2013; Meara et al., 2008; Psacharopoulos & Patrinos, 2004). Indeed, education is a 
key stratification variable in demographic behavior (see Lutz, Butz and KC 2014). For these 
reasons, the education expansion that has been sweeping the world during the last decades is 
to be highly welcomed. This expansion includes rising literacy rates (Crafts 2002) and 
increases in schooling enrollment rates and in completed years of primary, secondary and 
college education (Benavot and Riddle 1988, Benavot et al. 1991; Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal 
1992; Ramirez and Meyer 1980; Barro and Lee 2000; Cohen and Soto 2007; Morrisson and 
Murtin 2009). Regarding college education, by 1970, 6.4% of the world’s population aged 25-
29 had obtained a college degree. Three decades later, this proportion had increased to 13%, 
and the expected figure for 2050 is 29.4% (KC et al. 2010). 
Despite its relevance for many socio-demographic and economic outcomes – e.g. high levels 
of education inequality are associated with higher economic inequality and unemployment 
levels, lower social cohesion and higher poverty rates (Ballarino et al 2014) – researchers have 
only recently started to study how individuals’ education is distributed across and within 
countries (e.g. Castelló and Domenech 2002, Benaabdelaali et al. 2012, Dorius 2013, Meschi 
and Scervini 2013, Morrisson and Murtin 2009, 2013 or Jordá and Alonso 2016). While these 
studies differ in many respects (e.g. they typically employ different indicators, datasets and 
methodological approaches, and/or their geographic and temporal coverage does not 
necessarily coincide) they all cohere with the following narrative. As education started to 
expand at some point back in time during the modern era – predominantly in favor of men – 
education inequality began to increase. After several decades, as education expansion gradually 
shifted the population from low to highly educated categories, education inequality reached its 
highest point and afterwards started declining until the present day2. In other words: empirical 
evidence seems to support the existence of a Kuznets curve in education. This highly simplified 
narrative generally applies for the world as a whole, its different regions and most of its 
countries.  
A notable feature of the education expansion process is that it has not been gender neutral (Wils 
and Goujon 1998, Grant and Behrman 2010, Dorius and Firebaugh 2010). Despite initially 
favoring males, the gender gap has closed rapidly in recent years and, in many countries, even 
reversed in favor of women (Esteve, Garcia and Permanyer 2012), a trend that is expected to 
continue over the next decades (KC et al. 2010; Lutz and KC, 2011). In 1970, men represented 
63.6% of the total college educated population. This percentage decreased to 52.6% in 2000 
and it is likely to reach 44% in 2050, with most high-income countries reaching lower levels 
(KC et al 2010). The recent and prospective sex-specific share shifts across the education ladder 
– usually in favor of women – have attracted the attention of several researchers because of 
their potentially sizeable impacts across the board (e.g. fertility changes, higher female labor 
force participation and higher economic growth, or shifting power relations both in public and 
private domains; see Esteve et al 2012, 2016, Van Bavel 2012, Van Bavel and Klesment 2017). 
It should be pointed out that the gender gap in education – which is currently favoring women 
in most high- and middle-income countries – is not as large as it used to be when it favored 
men in the initial stages of the education expansion. 
 
Joint inequality trends: alternative hypotheses and scenarios  
Lacking any empirical evidence we can rely upon, we cannot but hypothesize what might be 
the relationship between overall education inequality (henceforth denoted as �) and its ‘basic 
subcomponents’: inequality among men (�� ), inequality among women (�� ), and the two 
subcomponents of the gender gap in education (i.e. inequality favoring men ( �� ) and 
inequality favoring women  ሺ��ሻሻ. A priori, there are many possible ways in which these 
subcomponents might have evolved over time in a way that fits the aforementioned stylized 
narratives on the trends in overall education inequality and the gender gap in education. In this 
regard, Figure 1 plots what might have been the hypothetical trajectories of �, �� and �� over 
time. In line with the existing empirical evidence, overall education inequality is posited to first 
increase and then decrease. What about the education inequality among men and among 
women? Since the education expansion initially benefited men, we expect �� to increase earlier 
than ��. Yet, since the education expansion for women took place in a shorter period of time, 
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 The studies by Castelló and Domenech 2002, Benaabdelaali et al. 2012, Meschi and Scervini 2013 and Jordá 
and Alonso 2016 focus on the second half of the 20th century, so they cover the downward part of the inverted U-
shape trajectory. The studies by Dorius 2013 and Morrisson and Murtin 2009, 2013 use data from the 19th to the 
20th century, so they cover the upward and downward portions of the trajectory. 
we expect �� to increase faster than ��. Based on the evidence reporting the closing and reversal 
of the gender gap in education in favor of women we expect �� to exceed �� at some point in 
time (denoted as ݐ in Figure 1). Yet, given that it is unlikely that obstacles to access education, 
which women experienced in the past, will be put in place for men, we do not expect the 
differences in these two quantities to be as large as they might have been during the first stages 
of the education expansion that predominantly benefited men (i.e. we expect the two curves to 
remain relatively close to each other after time ݐ). Whether or not this has actually been the 
case for the different world regions will be investigated in the empirical section of the paper. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic relationship between overall education inequality (�) and inequality among 
women (��) and men (��). Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
What about the relationship between trends in overall education inequality (�) and the gender 
gap in education? Are they expected to move in the same or in opposite directions? For ease of 
exposition, the latter will be denoted as � (an indicator taking negative and positive values, 
with negative values indicating gender gaps in favor of men, positive ones in favor of women, 
and 0 indicating equality between women and men; details given below). In Figure 2 we show 
a non-exhaustive sample of hypothetically plausible trajectories for � and � that are consistent 
with what current empirical evidence tells us about their non-monotonic trends (see above). In 
these diagrams, ݐ଴ denotes the time when � reaches its minimum, ݐ�  the time when the gender 
gap goes from negative to positive (i.e. when � = Ͳ), and ݐ� the time when overall inequality � 
reaches its maximum. The only substantive difference between the scenarios shown in Figure 
2 is the relative position of ݐ଴, ݐ�  and ݐ�  vis-à-vis each other and the time that has elapsed 
between them (i.e. the timing of these events).   
Take the first scenario, where the gender gap reversal occurs before overall education 
inequality reaches its maximum (i.e. ݐ� < ݐ�). For brevity, it will be referred to as an ‘early 
reversal scenario’ (see panel A in Figure 2). In this case, between years ݐ଴ and ݐ� , we observe 
increases in education inequality in tandem with reductions in the gender gap in education (i.e. 
inequalities running in opposite directions). Afterwards, between years ݐ�  and ݐ� we observe 
simultaneous increases in education inequality and in the gender gap in education. Consider 
now the second scenario, where the gender gap reversal occurs after overall education 
inequality reaches its maximum (i.e. ݐ� > ݐ� ). Symmetrically, this will be referred to as a 
‘delayed reversal’ scenario (see panel B in Figure 2). Here, between years ݐ଴ and ݐ� we observe 
increases in education inequality but reductions in the gender gap. Afterwards, between years ݐ� 
and ݐ� , there are reductions in education inequality and the gender gap in education. Lastly, 
panel C in Figure 2 depicts a hypothetical scenario in which overall education inequality and 
the gender gap in education reach its maximum the same year (i.e.  ݐ଴ = ݐ� ). For obvious 
reasons, it will be referred to as a ‘synchronic scenario’3. In that case, one would observe that 
overall education inequality and the gender gap in education would always go in the same 
direction. For the years preceding ݐ଴ both inequalities would increase simultaneously, and the 
opposite would happen after that year. 
In all these scenarios, there are periods in which overall education and gender inequality either 
go (i) in opposite directions, (ii) in the same normatively undesirable direction (i.e. 
simultaneously increasing), or (iii) in the same normatively desirable direction (i.e. 
simultaneously decreasing). In case (i), there are trade-offs among inequality types, i.e. one 
type of inequality is reduced at the expense of the other. In (ii) there is an important efficiency-
equality dilemma: education expansion is restricted to some groups of individuals and countries 
in such a way that both education inequality and the gender gap in education tend to increase 
over time. Lastly, in (iii) we observe the opposite trend: education expansion occurs in such a 
way that both education inequality and the gender gap in education reduce over time (i.e. there 
is no efficiency-equality dilemma). When this happens, we say that countries are passing 
through an opportunity window to potentially reap the benefits that such inequality reductions 
entail. 
How should we define the starting and ending points of such opportunity window? While the 
starting point is clearly set in the year where both overall education and gender inequality start 
declining simultaneously, the choice of the ending point can be more controversial. The 
difficulty stems from the fact that, since small gender gaps in favor of women are not 
necessarily undesirable from a normative point of view 4 , one might want to extend the 
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 It is important to highlight that the terms ‘early’, ‘delayed’ or ‘synchronic’ are merely descriptive and have no 
normative connotation, they just aim at describing the chronology of different events. 
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 While there is a broad consensus that gender gaps favoring men should count as ‘gender inequality’, the reverse 
situation generates some controversy. On the one hand, gender gaps in education favoring women are often not 
considered to be normatively undesirable. This point of view can be justified on the grounds that women’s edge 
in education somehow compensates the disadvantage they experience in other domains (e.g. lower wages or labor 
force participation). In this line, Grant and Behrman (2010) suggest that women’s educational advantage might 
be explained because “in contexts where labor markets and cultural traditions are gender biased, young women 
may be aware that education might be the only opportunity to increase their status in society”, thereby implying 
that female educational advantage should not be really counted as ‘gender inequality’. In this line, the Gender Gap 
Index (GGI) from the World Economic Forum caps the gender gaps at one, tacitly assuming that gender gaps in 
favor of women are de facto equivalent to ‘gender equality’. On the other hand, some composite measures of 
gender disparities count any departure from complete equality as ‘gender inequality’, no matter if it favors women 
or men (e.g. the United Nations’ Gender Development Index (GDI) and Gender Inequality Index (GII) or the 
Gender Equality Index (GEI) from the European Institute for Gender Equality). In this paper, we adopt an 
opportunity window period until the gender gap goes beyond a certain upper bound � ൒ Ͳ – 
as long as overall education inequality � continues to decline. The year in which such threshold 
is attained will be denoted as ݐ� (it is illustrated in panel B of Figure 2). Clearly, when � =Ͳ, ݐ� = ݐ� . 
One of the main aims of this paper is to report the different time periods in which world regions 
either experience (i) trade-offs among inequality types, (ii) increases in both types of 
inequalities, or (iii) simultaneous decreases (i.e. report if they experience the aforementioned 
efficiency-equality dilemmas or not).  
  
 
Figure 2. The timing of education inequality and the gender gap in education in different 
hypothetical scenarios: (A) Early reversal scenario:  ݐ� < ݐ� , (B) Delayed reversal 
scenario: ݐ� > ݐ�, and (C) Synchronic scenario: ݐ଴ = ݐ�. Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
                                                          
intermediate position and consider that sizeable departures from complete gender equality beyond a loosely 
defined threshold are normatively undesirable. 
 3. Data  
Like most studies on education inequality we have used the dataset of Barro and Lee (2015), 
which is currently the largest in terms of geographic and temporal coverage. The data is based 
on a compilation of censuses and surveys by UNESCO and provides comparable information 
on 7 educational attainment categories (no education, primary uncompleted, primary 
completed, secondary uncompleted, secondary completed, tertiary uncompleted and tertiary 
completed) for 146 countries during the period 1950-2010. Whenever appropriate, these 
categories can be reduced to 4 (no education, some primary, some secondary and some 
tertiary).  
We used the estimates from Barro and Lee on educational attainment for the period 1950-2010 
without further adjustments. At the same time, we decided to calculate our own projections of 
future educational attainment using a similar procedure to Barro and Lee’s. Calculating our 
own predictions allowed us to focus on the age group 30-34, instead of the age group 15-64 for 
which the projections of Barro and Lee were calculated. Selecting this age group enables us to 
minimize the influence of changes in the age structure within countries on our estimates and at 
the same time will show the most recent changes in educational attainment (by the age of 30-
34, the vast majority of individuals have achieved their highest educational attainment). 
Another motivation has been that some implausible values were observed in the Barro and Lee 
projections.5  
Projections 
Our projections of future educational attainment are based on a logistic growth curve model 
estimated for the period 1950-2010 that allows for country-specific time trends (random 
slopes). The model, estimated separately for men, women, and each of the three educational 
stages, can be expressed as follows:   ݈� ቆ ݏ௝�ͳͲͲ − ݏ௝�ቇ = ߙ௝ + ߚ௝ݐ + �௝�                   [ͳ] 
where ݏ௝�  is the share of the population having attended educational stage j in year t. The 
coefficient ߚ௝  in this case estimates the (linear) time trend in the (logistically transformed) 
share of the population attending the given educational stage. The model estimates country-
specific constants (ߙ௝) as well as separate coefficients ߚ௝ for each country (random slopes in a 
multi-level model where the two levels are countries and years, �௝� constitutes the error term), 
so that the predicted educational expansion over time is allowed to follow different trajectories 
across countries. In this model, countries are expected to eventually approach a 100% 
attendance for primary and secondary education. It appears unrealistic to expect countries to 
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converge to a 100% attendance of tertiary education. We therefore arbitrarily set a ceiling of 
70% for tertiary education. As shown later, predictions using this ceiling fit the data well. 
The coefficients from these models are used to project attendance of educational stages for the 
period 2015-2040. In order to arrive at the 7 educational categories of the historical data, we 
multiplied attendance shares with the completion rates observed in 2010 for each given country 
and gender (we multiplied the share of the population that is predicted to attend an educational 
stage in year t, by ‘share completed in 2010’ / ‘share attended in 2010’). 6  To safeguard 
comparability across historical time periods and projections, we decided to present predicted 
results based on our growth models for all the time period 1950-2040. In the results section we 




In this paper we treat educational attainment as an ordinal variable. This is a non-trivial decision 
with important implications that stands in sharp contrast to previous studies on education 
inequality across individuals7. There are several reasons why we have made this decision. On 
the one hand, cardinal variables like ‘years of schooling’ can be a poor proxy of the substantive 
type of education individuals might have received and their interpretation can be biased 
because of (i) the country-specific duration of different education cycles, and (ii) the existence 
of repeaters. In addition, ‘years of schooling’ is quite prone to measurement error due to recall 
bias. On the other hand, ordinal variables are much less prone to measurement error. As 
opposed to what happens with ‘years of schooling’, the meaning of the ordinal variable 
categories (e.g. attaining primary, secondary or tertiary education) is reasonably comparable 
across countries and over time.  
The major disadvantage of using ordinal variables is that their variability cannot be ascertained 
with well-known inequality measures, like the Gini coefficient or the Theil index among many 
others (indeed this is the key practical reason why education inequality studies have always 
relied on cardinal variables). One of the contributions of this paper is to partially fill this gap 
enlarging the practitioner’s toolkit by proposing a new inequality measure specifically designed 
for ordinal variables. 
A new measure of education inequality for ordinal data 
The tools available to assess inequality are substantially reduced when working with ordinal 
variables (the main reason being that the notion of ‘mean’ – which is crucial in the definition 
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 Studies like Castelló and Domenech (2002), Benaabdelaali et al. (2012) or Jordá and Alonso (2016) cardinalize 
the Barro and Lee dataset using different techniques (the first two estimate the average length of each education 
cycle while the last one fits a continuous distribution to capture ‘within-cycle variations’). Others, like Meschi 
and Scervini (2013) or Morrisson and Murtin (2009, 2013), work with the cardinal variable ‘years of schooling’. 
of cardinal inequality measures – is not meaningful in the ordinal case; see Allison and Foster 
2004). In this section we propose a new measure of inequality for ordinal variables that has 
useful decomposability properties. This measure indicates the probability that two randomly 
chosen individuals have different education attainments. Let  ݇  be the generic number of 
education categories we will be working with (in our case ݇ = ͹) and let � be the population 
size. We will denote the number of individuals in the population with educational attainment  ݅ (with  ͳ ൑ ݅ ൑ ݇) as  �௜ , and  �௜ = �௜ �⁄  will be the corresponding population share. We 
define our ordinal inequality measure as 
�ሺ�ଵ, ⋯ , �௞ሻ ≔ ∑ ∑ �௜�௝�ሺ݅, ݆ሻ௝=௞௝=ଵ௜=௞௜=ଵ               [ʹ] 
where �ሺ݅, ݆ሻ is an indicator function that takes a value of 1 whenever ݅ ≠ ݆ and 0 otherwise. 
Whenever all individuals have the same educational achievement (i.e.  �௜ = ͳ  for some 
category ݅) there is no inequality, so � = Ͳ. For any other distribution, � takes strictly positive 
values. The index is maximized whenever the population is evenly spread out across all 
education categories8 (i.e. �௜ = ͳ/݇ for all ݅ = ͳ, ⋯ , ݇). 
A useful feature of the ordinal inequality index suggested here is that it is nicely decomposable 
when the population is partitioned in different groups. In this paper we consider the partition 
of the population between women and men (�� and �� denote their corresponding population 
sizes), but any other population partition in an arbitrary large number of groups would do as 
well. Let �௜� , �௜�  be the number of women and men with educational attainment ݅ 
(hence �௜� + �௜� = �௜ሻ. Their relative shares are denoted as �௜� , �௜� . It is straightforward to 
check that our inequality index can be decomposed as � = ݏ��� + ݏ��� + ݏ�(�� + ��)              [3] 
where �� = �(�ଵ� , ⋯ , �௞�)                           [Ͷ] �� = �ሺ�ଵ�, ⋯ , �௞�ሻ                          [ͷ]   
�� = ∑ ∑ �௜��௝�௝<௜                            [͸] ௜=௞௜=ଶ  
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 A priori, one might expect inequality to be maximized when the population is split in two equally sized groups 
located at the extremes of the distribution (formally, when �ଵ = �௞ = ͳ/ʹ and all other �௜ = Ͳ). Even if it is not 
entirely clear whether such distribution maximizes inequality or polarization (see Esteban and Ray 1994), such 
inequality measures exist and have already been proposed in the literature (see Abul Naga and Yalcin 2008 and 
Kobus and Milos 2012). Unfortunately, these measures are not amenable to the additive decomposition we 
propose in this paper, and yet their values are highly correlated with the ones given by our measure (see details 
below). 
�� = ∑ ∑ �௜��௝�௝<௜                          [͹] ௜=௞௜=ଶ  ݏ� = ��ሺ�� − ͳሻ �ሺ� − ͳሻ⁄        [ͺ] ݏ� = ��ሺ�� − ͳሻ �ሺ� − ͳሻ⁄     [ͻ] ݏ� = ʹ���� �ሺ� − ͳሻ⁄                 [ͳͲ] 
The derivation of equation [3] is shown in Appendix 1. �� and �� are the inequalities within the 
groups of women and men respectively,�� , ��  the inequalities between women and men 
favoring women and favoring men respectively, and ݏ� , ݏ�,ݏ� represent the relative weight of 
each component depending on the population size of each group. The between-group 
component �� (resp. ��) measures the probability that a randomly selected woman has higher 
(resp. lower) educational attainment than a randomly selected man. Therefore, �� and �� can 
be interpreted as women’s educational advantage over men and vice versa. Using these two 
components we define the extent of gender (in)equality in a given society as �: = �� − ��, a 
measure ranging from −ͳ to ͳ. If � = −ͳ, there is no woman whose educational attainment is 
higher than that of any man, and if � = ͳ, the reverse is true. When the education distributions 
of women and men are identical, � = Ͳ. This measure is not monotonic: values above Ͳ reflect 
a better state of affairs for women and vice-versa. The additive decomposition formula shown 
in [3] articulates into a coherent whole overall education inequality and its four basic 
subcomponents.  
Currently there are only a few other measures of inequality adapted to the ordinal setting (see 
Abul Naga and Yalcin 2008 and Kobus and Milos 2012). Unfortunately, such measures do not 
admit the additive decomposition shown in equation [3], so they have not been considered in 
this paper9. It turns out that our index for ordinal variables is intimately related with two other 
classical measures of heterogeneity defined in the context of nominal and cardinal variables 
respectively: the ‘index of fractionalization’ and the ‘Gini coefficient’. Indeed, all three 
measures have much in common because they are grounded in the same basic principle: two 
individuals are picked at random and one inspects whether (or to what extent) they share a 
given characteristic/attribute. The only difference between the nominal, ordinal and cardinal 
cases is the metric that is used to assess the similarity between pairs of individuals. In the 
nominal case one inspects whether the two individuals belong to different pre-specified groups 
or not, in the ordinal one whether one of the corresponding attainments is superior to the other 
or not and in the cardinal case one takes into account the distance between the corresponding 
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 For the sake of completeness we have compared our results with the ones we would obtain using the alternative 
inequality measures proposed by Abul Naga and Yalcin (2008) and Kobus (2015). It turns out that they are highly 
correlated (ݎ=0.86) – details not shown here but available upon request. 
(cardinal) attainments. Not surprisingly, all three measures have an extremely similar 
functional form10. 
 
Interpreting inequality decompositions 
Equation [3] is reminiscent of well-known additive decompositions of inequality in within- and 
between-group components for the cardinal case. Yet, the interpretations in both cases are 
entirely different. In the cardinal case, the between-group component is the inequality that 
would be observed in a hypothetical distribution where each individual had the same 
educational attainment as the mean in his group. Yet, it does not make sense to speak about the 
contribution of between-group inequality to overall inequality in the ordinal context because 
the notion of ‘mean’ is not applicable. Instead, the term ݏ�(�� + ��) in equation [3] should 
be interpreted as the proportion of pairwise comparisons where individuals have different 
educational attainments involving a woman and a man. To illustrate the difference between 
both approaches consider a hypothetical scenario where the number of women and men and 
their educational attainments turned out to be exactly the same. For the cardinal case the 
between-group component would go to zero because the gender-specific means would be the 
same. In the ordinal setting proposed here, the between-group component would amount to 
50% because half of the education comparisons between pairs of randomly selected individuals 
would involve a woman and a man. Indeed, in such hypothetical scenario the contribution to 
overall inequality of the four subcomponents shown in [3] would be exactly the same: 25%. 
These fundamental differences should be taken into account when interpreting the results. 
 
5. Empirical findings 
In this section we present our empirical findings based on the systematic exploration of the 7 
education categories’ distributions that are reported in the Barro and Lee (2015) dataset. We 
start documenting the global education expansion and the gender gap reversal during the period 
1950-2040 using our model predicted data (see section 3). Afterwards, we calculate the 
corresponding education inequality index together with its four subcomponents, and report 
their values and trends – both globally and regionally – for the same time periods.  Finally, we 
analyze the relationship between overall education inequality, its components and the gender 
gap in education.  
Education expansion  
Figure 3 presents the share of women having attended primary, secondary, and tertiary 
education for 7 world regions as well as the predicted shares based on our models. Whereas 
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 The fractionalization index for nominal variables can be written exactly as in equation [2] and the Gini 
coefficient can be written as ∑ ∑ �௜�௝௝=௞௝=ଵ |ሺ�௜/�ሻ−ሺ�௝/�ሻ|௜=௞௜=ଵ , where �௜ is the value of the cardinal variable one 
is interested in for group ݅ and � is the mean of the distribution. In this respect, our index I can be thought as the 
‘missing link’ between the index of fractionalization and the Gini coefficient. 
attendance to primary education was only close to being universal in Advanced Economies and 
Eastern Europe in 1950, shares close to universality have now reached East Asia and Latin 
America, and this pattern is expected to extend to South Asia, the Middle East and Africa by 
2040. Attendance to secondary education was still a minority phenomenon in all world regions 
in 1950, but today a majority of individuals in most world regions attends secondary education. 
In all regions but South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa more than 90% of women are expected 
to attend secondary education by 2040. Tertiary education was not very extended in the 1950s, 
but almost half of the women aged 30-34 are expected to attain tertiary education by 2040 in 
all regions but Sub-Saharan Africa, where tertiary education is predicted to increase only 
slowly. Figures for men are similar and displayed in Appendix 2.  
For the period 1950-2010, Figure 3 shows both predicted and actual shares of attendance. The 
fact that the two sets of shares are hardly distinguishable from each other in the graph reflects 
the good fit of the logistic growth curve models described in section 3. Only for secondary 
education in Eastern Europe and primary education in East Asia some differences between both 
become visible in certain time periods. Due to this relatively neat fit between predictions and 
reality, we believe that presenting our model-predicted results does not imply a qualitatively 
important loss of information.  
 Figure 3. Women’s attendance of educational stages 1950-2040, by region, predicted and 
actual (weighted by population size of countries). Parts in greyscale are predicted values. 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the BL dataset. 
 
Gender gap reversal in education 
We continue to describe the development of educational attainment over time by presenting 
our measure of the gender gap in education. Figure 4 displays, for the 7 world regions as well 
as for the world overall, how the gender gap in education has actually developed from 1950 to 
2010 and how it is expected to develop across time until 2040. Recall that negative values 
represent distributions where women are likely to be less educated than men and vice versa. In 
line with previous research, one can observe that women used to be less educated than men in 
the past in all world regions, but this gender gap has reduced dramatically across the globe, and 
even reversed in the Advanced Economies, Eastern Europe, and Latin America well before 
2010. The gender gap in these three regions must have reached its historical minimum in a 
period preceding 1950. The evolution of the gender gap has not always been monotonic: in the 
regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, East Asia Pacific and South 
Asia it has initially declined, attained its minimum somewhere between 1960 and 1990 (see 
the first column of Table 2) and then started increasing towards gender equality. By 2040, the 
gender gap is expected to be closed and slightly reversed in almost all world regions (the only 
exception being Sub-Saharan Africa). While at the beginning of our observation window we 
can clearly distinguish two clusters of regions (on the one hand the Advanced Economies, 
Eastern Europe, and Latin America – henceforth referred to as ‘forerunning regions’ – and on 
the other hand Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, East Asia Pacific and 
South Asia – referred to as ‘laggard regions’) by 2040 most gender gaps are expected to 
converge towards a slightly positive value indicating some educational advantage in favor of 
women. Inspecting the ‘global gender gap in education’ (i.e. taking the entire world as a unit 
of analysis), we also observe a U-shaped trajectory over time. In 2010, the global gender gap 
was still in favor of men but this is not expected to be the case anymore by 2040. This story 
differs from the conclusion of an ever-decreasing gap in education between men and women 




Figure 4. Gender Gap in Education across the period 1950-2040, weighted by country 
population size. Parts in greyscale are predicted values. Source: Authors’ calculations based on 
the BL dataset. 
 
Evolution of Overall Education Inequality and its components 
Figure 5 displays the development of education inequality across the world and within world 
regions based on ordinal educational categories. It also simultaneously displays the four 
components of the inequality decomposition formula shown in equation [3]. The thick solid 
line represents overall inequality I over time and roughly follows an inverted U-shaped curve 
worldwide, congruent with the results of Dorius (2013) and Morrisson and Murtin (2013). Each 
region individually appears to follow a part of that curve during the period under study. In some 
regions inequality used to be still relatively low in the 1950s, but inequality increased with time 
and educational expansion. In other regions, inequality was already high but has recently 
started to decrease slightly. This decrease is expected to continue in the future, and to find its 




Figure 5. Educational Inequality and its components across time and space, 1950-2040, 
weighted by country population size. Parts in greyscale are predicted values. Source: Authors’ 
calculations based on the BL dataset. 
The other curves of Figure 5 represent educational inequality within women and men (�� 
and ��), as well as the probability that a randomly selected woman has higher education than 
a randomly selected man (��) and vice versa (��). The lines for inequality within men and 
women are only visible during the period 1950-2000 and only for those regions with lower 
levels of education (i.e. the laggard regions of Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North 
Africa, East Asia Pacific and South Asia). In those regions inequality in terms of education 
among women was much lower than inequality among men in the 1950s. By the 2010s, 
inequality among men and women became very similar to overall education inequality, so the 
three curves are indistinguishable from each other in the right tails of the graphs. This means 
that in the past women used to be a considerably more homogeneous group in terms of 
education compared to men. Surprisingly, despite the reversal in the gender gap observed and 
its expected persistence in the future, the groups of men and women are expected to remain 
equally unequal in the period 2010-2040. The educational disadvantage of men therefore does 
not seem to translate into them being a more homogeneous group in terms of education 
compared to women – as we were originally expecting. Overall, this suggests that the stylized 
trajectories shown in Figure 1 are a rough approximation of what has actually happened with 
overall and gender-specific education inequalities in the different world regions. 
Contribution of the Different Components to Overall Education Inequality 
Table 1 displays the relative contribution of each of the four components discussed in the 
previous section to overall education inequality (these are derived from decomposition formula 
[3]). Recall that, as a reference, in a hypothetical country where the educational attainment of 
men was identical to that of women, the percent contribution of the four components shown in 
Table 1 would be exactly the same: 25%. As can be seen, the composition of education 
inequality has been shifting dramatically over time. Back in the 1950s, inequality among 
women contributed very little to overall education inequality in the laggard regions (e.g. a mere 
contribution of 9.9% in South Asia), while the opposite was true for inequality among men 
(e.g. 38.9% in the same region). At the beginning of our observation period, the educational 
advantage of men over women was by far the main contributor to education inequality in the 
world as a whole and in most of its regions (see last column in Table 1). Sixty years later, that 
contribution has decreased substantially at a global level. Indeed, in the forerunning regions 
(i.e. in most high- and middle-income countries) it has become the least important contributor 
to education inequality (i.e. 23.5%, 21.9% and 23.3% for the advanced economies, Eastern 
Europe and Latin America in 2010). Concomitant with these changes, the educational 
advantage of women over men has become an increasingly important ingredient of overall 
education inequality (see second-to-last column in Table 1). Sixty years ago, the contribution 
of that kind of inequality to overall education inequality was by far the least important among 
the four (particularly so in the poorest regions of the world, e.g. only 9% in South Asia). 
Nowadays, women’s educational advantage is the main contributor to education inequality in 
most high- and middle-income countries (i.e. 26.6%, 28.3% and 26.7% for the advanced 
economies, Eastern Europe and Latin America in 2010).  
Region Year %C�� %C�� %C�� %C�� 
Advanced Economies 1950 26.8 23.2 22.8 27.2 
Advanced Economies 1980 24.5 25.4 23.6 26.5 
Advanced Economies 2010 24.4 25.6 26.6 23.5 
Advanced Economies 2040 23.7 26.2 27.2 22.8 
East Asia and the Pacific 1950 16.1 32.9 13.5 37.5 
East Asia and the Pacific 1980 22.8 26.6 17.2 33.4 
East Asia and the Pacific 2010 24.2 25.7 24.0 26.1 
East Asia and the Pacific 2040 21.7 28.2 27.2 22.8 
E. Europe & Central Asia 1950 33.1 17.8 20.1 28.9 
E. Europe & Central Asia 1980 25.6 24.3 24.1 26.0 
E. Europe & Central Asia 2010 25.8 24.0 28.3 21.9 
E. Europe & Central Asia 2040 23.8 26.1 28.1 22.1 
Latin America & Carib. 1950 23.7 26.0 21.3 29.0 
Latin America & Carib. 1980 25.1 24.8 23.7 26.3 
Latin America & Carib. 2010 25.7 24.2 26.7 23.3 
Latin America & Carib. 2040 23.4 26.0 30.0 20.6 
Middle E.& North Africa 1950 12.1 37.4 11.7 38.7 
Middle E.& North Africa 1980 18.6 29.6 14.6 37.2 
Middle E.& North Africa 2010 23.2 26.5 21.7 28.5 
Middle E.& North Africa 2040 22.9 26.7 26.6 23.7 
South Asia 1950 9.9 38.9 9.0 42.2 
South Asia 1980 16.0 31.8 12.0 40.2 
South Asia 2010 21.7 27.4 17.5 33.5 
South Asia 2040 22.3 27.7 25.0 24.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1950 16.6 31.9 14.4 37.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1980 21.2 27.4 16.1 35.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2010 23.7 26.0 20.2 30.1 
Sub-Saharan Africa 2040 24.7 25.2 22.3 27.8 
World 1950 23.2 26.5 20.9 29.4 
World 1980 23.6 26.1 20.4 29.9 
World 2010 24.4 25.5 22.8 27.3 
World 2040 23.1 26.9 25.9 24.1 
Table 1. Inequality in educational attainment by region and year for 25-29 year-olds, 
decomposed into within and between women/men components. �: Overall inequality; �� , ��: 
Inequality among women and men respectively; ��/��: Probability that a randomly selected 
woman/man is more educated than a randomly selected man/woman; %C: Percent contribution 
of the different components. Authors’ calculations based on Barro and Lee (2013). 
 
The relationship between gender equality and overall inequality 
What can we say about the relationship between the gender gap in education and overall 
education inequality in the midst of the aforementioned compositional changes? Have they 
moved in the same or in opposite directions?  To give a precise account of the joint levels and 
trends of � and �, in Figure 6 we present a full-fledged description of how these two indicators 
have co-varied over time for the world and its regions (the values of � are shown in the vertical 
axis and those of � in the horizontal one). Putting together the world regions’ experiences 
shown in that figure, we conclude this section presenting a broad-strokes account of the joint 
evolution of education and gender inequality, which consists in four stages. Stage I: The male-
dominated education expansion brings increases in education inequality and drives the gender 
gap in education in favor of men. In this case, both inequalities temporarily go in the 
normatively undesirable direction, and might therefore be a period where educational 
expansion has most externalities. Stage II: The delayed incorporation of women into mass 
education tilts the gender gap towards the opposite direction and brings further increases in 
education inequality until it reaches its maximum. Here, both kinds of inequality go in opposite 
directions and trade-offs between both policy objectives emerge. During this stage potential 
efforts to slow down education expansion in order to prevent overall education inequality from 
rising further could be at odds with reducing the gender gap in education. Stage III: When 
further education expansion gradually shifts the population towards the higher educational 
categories, education inequality starts declining and the gender gap goes to zero: this is the 
onset of an opportunity window where education expands while both inequalities decrease 
simultaneously. Stage IV: Further education expansion, particularly in favor of women, 
reverses the gender gap in education while further decreasing overall education inequality.  
Even if not all regions (let alone the individual countries) fit this stylized description, it 
reasonably represents the different trajectories shown in Figure 7. For the laggard regions of 
the Middle East and North Africa, East Asia Pacific and South Asia we can observe the 
occurrence of stages I, II and III. Until 2010 Sub-Saharan Africa had only completed stages I 
and II, and it is expected that by 2040 it will have entered in the third one. As regards the 
advanced economies and Eastern Europe, we observe the occurrence of stages II, III and IV 
during our 1950-2040 study period. Lastly, the region of Latin America stands out as being the 
only one that does not fit very well our 4-stage narrative. The initial reductions of the gender 
gap go in tandem with increases in education inequality and the posterior decreases in 
education inequality occur when the gender gap increases in favor of women. Whereas future 
educational expansion in other regions is expected to simultaneously reduce both forms of 
inequality, expansion in Latin America is likely to increase the gender gap favoring women to 
relatively high levels.  
  
Figure 6. Development of gender and overall inequality in education over time. Parts in 
greyscale are predicted values. Source: Authors’ calculations based on the BL dataset. 
Drawing from the results shown in Figure 6, in Figure 7 we indicate the starting and the end of 
the time periods in which the world and its regions have either experienced (i) trade-offs among 
these inequality types, (ii) increases in both types of inequalities, or (iii) simultaneous 
decreases11. During the time frame considered here all world regions (except in Latin America) 
have gone through periods where education expansion has not been an egalitarian process, as 
it simultaneously increased both kinds of inequalities. Generally, this period has been longer 
for the laggard regions (e.g. 40 years in South Asia) and considerably shorter for the 
forerunning ones. Analogously, all regions have experienced considerable periods of time with 
trade-offs between overall education inequality and the gender gap in education (i.e. periods in 
which one inequality could only be reduced at the expense of increasing the other). At one 
extreme, the advanced economies have only experienced such periods for relatively short time 
spells (15 years), while at the other extreme, Latin America has experienced them almost 
during the entire time frame (80 years). Overall, there have been many more periods in which 
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 To generate this table, we have assumed that values of the gender gap between 0 and 0.1 (i.e. slight education 
advantage in favor of women) are not normatively undesirable. 
education inequality increased in tandem with gender gap reductions than periods with the 
opposite combination. Lastly, the world and all its regions have also gone through considerably 
long periods without experiencing the efficiency-equality dilemma. The longer the duration of 
those periods, the more likely the corresponding countries can reap the benefits associated to 
the reduction of both types of inequality. While some regions are expected to take advantage 
of such opportunity window only for a decade (e.g. South Asia, between 2030 and 2040), others 
have benefited and are expected to benefit from it during 65 years (e.g. advanced economies, 
between 1975 and 2040). The world taken as a whole entered such period in 1990, and is 
expected to continue until 2040 with some small interruptions. 
Inspecting Figures 2, 4, 5 and 6, we can say that the world as a whole and most of its regions 
– all except Latin America – have experimented or are likely to experiment in the near future 
the ‘delayed recovery scenario’. The Latin American experience seems to fit the ‘early 






































Advanced Economies 1 2 1 3 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
East Asia and the Pacific 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 4 4 4 2 4 2 4 
Europe and Central Asia 2 2 1 4 4 4 4 4 2 4 2 2 2 2 4 2 2 2 
Latin America and the Caribbean 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 2 4 3 3 3 3 
Middle East and North Africa 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
South Asia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 3 
World 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 
 
  Both Overall and Gender Inequality Increasing 
  Gender Inequality Decreasing, Overall Inequality Increasing 
  Gender Inequality Increasing, Overall Inequality Decreasing 
  
Both Overall and Gender Inequality Decreasing 
 
Figure 6. Summary of time periods during which trends in gender and overall education inequality go in simultaneous or different directions. 
 
  
6. Summary and concluding remarks 
The main aim of this research was to investigate the relationship between overall education 
inequality, its different subcomponents and the gender gap reversal in educational attainment. 
For that purpose, we have developed a new inequality index with nice decomposability 
properties adapted to the ordinal nature of educational attainment. Such decomposition – which 
for the first time allows articulating the different components of education inequality 
(inequality among women and men, inequality favoring men and inequality favoring women) 
into a coherent whole – can be extremely useful for scholars and policy-makers to gauge the 
transformations that certain factors might have exerted on different parts of the education 
distribution. Based on the Barro and Lee (2015) dataset we have calculated the values of the 
inequality index and the contribution of its components for 146 countries during a period 
spanning almost a century (1950-2040).  
The composition of education inequality has changed dramatically during the period between 
1950 and 2010. In the past, women used to be a much more homogeneous group compared to 
men in terms of education in several world regions. With education expansion, inequality 
among women quickly started to increase. We expected that as the gender gap in education 
reversed in favor of women, the inequality among them would be higher than the inequality 
among men. Surprisingly, our results show that inequality among men and women is now 
equally unequal in all world regions, and this is expected to remain so in the near future. Back 
in the 1950s, the educational advantage of men over women was by far the main contributor to 
education inequality in the world as a whole and in most of its regions, while the opposite was 
true about the educational advantage of women over men. Nowadays, men’s educational 
advantage has become the least important contributor to education inequality in several regions, 
while women’s educational advantage is the main contributor to education inequality in most 
high- and middle-income countries.  
How have education inequality and the gender gap in education jointly evolved over time as 
education expands? Our findings suggest that most world regions have experienced, are 
experiencing or are expected to experience a period whereby both education inequality and the 
gender gap decline simultaneously – i.e. an opportunity window to potentially reap the benefits 
that such inequality reductions entail. Yet, assuming that large educational advantages of one 
sex over the other are normatively undesirable our findings suggest that in the near future there 
might be difficult trade-offs between gender and overall education inequality, as they both 
seem to run in opposite directions. If further education expansion contributes to further 
decreases in overall education inequality and increases in females’ educational advantage over 
men (a scenario that appears likely until a ceiling of tertiary education attainment is reached in 
many countries), education planners might be facing a difficult ethical dilemma (particularly 
in high-income countries) upon which it will be necessary to reflect.  
What should one expect for the more distant future? Will education inequality continue to 
decline and the gender gap to increasingly favor women? In line with Inglehart and Welzel 
(2005), our expectations are that as long as the modernization process continues to unfold, it 
will facilitate cultural changes that make gender equality increasingly likely. Since we 
speculate that gender equality has come to stay, we expect that the gender gap in education will 
not continue increasing to attain the high levels it had in the initial stages of the male-dominated 
education expansion, but will rather hover around gender parity levels.  
As regards education inequality there are a couple of reasons to not expect a continuation of its 
currently downward trend for a long time. First, while the global decline in overall education 
inequality (both for women and for men) is a cause of celebration pointing to an increasing 
equalization of opportunities across citizens worldwide, it is likely that new forms of education 
inequality not captured in our data might be (or already have been) replacing older ones. Indeed 
one can suspect that the observed declines in overall education inequality can be the attributed 
to the clustering of the educational attainment distribution at its top, which might be hiding an 
increasing diversity of superior education alternatives (like Masters and PhDs) not captured in 
the 7 categories of Barro and Lee’s dataset. Some exploratory work carried out for the case of 
the US using census microdata samples (not shown here but available upon request) suggests 
that this might be indeed the case. When we enlarge the set of education categories from 7 to 
9 (including Masters and PhDs), the decline in overall education inequality is less pronounced. 
In the same line, a recent study by Meschi and Scervini (2013) suggests that after a long period 
of sustained decline, education inequality is turning upwards in many European countries as a 
result of the expansion of tertiary and post-tertiary schooling. 
Second, education inequality is intimately associated with technological progress and 
economic inequality, two forces that are unlikely to remain stable over time. Under the 
assumption that technology is skill-biased (Tinbergen 1974), technological progress will widen 
inequality among skill groups unless it is countered by increases in the supply of educated 
workers. Depending on the outcome of the ‘race between education and technology’ (Goldin 
and Katz 2008) – which is particularly uncertain – income and education inequality levels can 
vary to a great extent. Along similar lines, Milanovic (2016) recently suggested that the modern 
historical era from the preindustrial through the postindustrial period is characterized by the 
so-called ‘Kuznets waves’ of alternating increases and decreases in economic inequality, with 
many high-income countries currently in the upward portion of the wave. In all likelihood, the 
‘economic Kuznets waves’ will translate into ‘education Kuznets waves’, thereby increasing 
education inequality as well. Whether or not such incipient trends will consolidate in the near 
future is a matter for future research. 
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Appendix 1. Derivation of Equation [3]. 
Manipulating algebraically it is easy to show that 
�ሺ�ଵ, ⋯ , �௞ሻ = ∑ ∑ �௜�௝�ሺ݅, ݆ሻ௝=௞௝=ଵ௜=௞௜=ଵ = ∑ ∑ �௜�௝௝≠௜௞௜=ଵ�ሺ� − ͳሻ = ∑ ∑ ሺ�௜� + �௜�ሻሺ�௝� + �௝�ሻ௝≠௜௞௜=ଵ �ሺ� − ͳሻ  
= ∑ ∑ �௜��௝�௝≠௜௞௜=ଵ + ∑ ∑ �௜��௝�௝≠௜௞௜=ଵ + ∑ ∑ �௜��௝�௝≠௜௞௜=ଵ + ∑ ∑ �௜��௝�௝≠௜௞௜=ଵ�ሺ� − ͳሻ  
= [��ሺ�� − ͳሻ�ሺ� − ͳሻ ] ∑ ∑ �௜��௝�௝≠௜௞௜=ଵ��ሺ�� − ͳሻ + [��ሺ�� − ͳሻ�ሺ� − ͳሻ ] ∑ ∑ �௜��௝�௝≠௜௞௜=ଵ��ሺ�� − ͳሻ + 
+ [ʹ �����ሺ� − ͳሻ] ∑ ∑ �௜��௝�௝≠௜௞௜=ଵ ����= ݏ��� + ݏ��� + ݏ����� ቌ∑ ∑ �௜��௝�௝<௜௜=௞௜=ଶ + ∑ ∑ �௜��௝�௝<௜௜=௞௜=ଶ ቍ= ݏ��� + ݏ��� + ݏ� ቌ∑ ∑ �௜��௝�௝<௜௜=௞௜=ଶ + ∑ ∑ �௜��௝�௝<௜௜=௞௜=ଶ ቍ= ݏ��� + ݏ��� + ݏ�(�� + ��). 
This is the decomposition we were looking for. 
 
  
Appendix 2. Actual and predicted attendance of educational stages for men 1950-2040 
 
 
